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LESTER WAYNE SMITH and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS SISCO HILTE and 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did Smith's lifting of fifty pounds, one and a half feet 
from knee level to his waist, contribute something substantial 
to the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his 
preexisting back condition? 
Jurisdictional Statement 
Jurisdiction vests pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 
(Supp. 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND CASE 
The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 
(Supp.1986), a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 
Case No. 870592-CA 
(Case Priority No. 6) 
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"A." The determinative case is Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), a copy of which is attached as 
Addendum "B," 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Smith claims benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the Industrial 
Commission: 
1. On August 26, 1986, Smith filed an Application with 
the Industrial Commission, seeking compensation and medical 
benefits from his employer, Sisco Hilte and its insurance 
carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company, ("Appellants"). 
(R. at 4-5.) 
2. Appellants deny that Smith suffered a compensable 
accident. (R. at 7. ) 
3. On July 30, 1986, Judge Moffitt issued her Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. She determined that 
although Smith had a pre-existing back condition, his 1986 
lifting episode constituted a compensable industrial accident. 
(R. at 290-296.) See Addendum "C." 
4. On August 17, 1987, appellants filed a Motion For 
Review contending that Smith's lifting incident did not 
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constitute a compensable industrial accident. (R. at 197, 
258-60 and 265-66.) 
5. The Industrial Commission denied appellants' Motion 
for Review on December 7, 1987, concluding that it "does not 
believe a typical nonemployment activity of men and women in 
the latter part of the twentieth century includes lifting 50 
pounds." (R. at 306.) See Addendum "D4" 
6. On December 31, 1987, Appellants sought review by this 
Court of the Industrial Commission's Denial of Appellant's 
Motion. (R. at 308.) 
C. Statement of the Facts: 
1. While at work on March 25, 1986, Smith lifted a steel 
plate from a knee high stack, approximately one and one-half 
feet to his waist. (R. at 291.) The steel plate weighed fifty 
pounds. (R. at 41.) It was 8 to 12 feet long by 14 inches 
wide by 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch thick. After lifting the plate 
to his waist, Smith "set it back down." (R. at 15, 17, 41 and 
291.) 
2. While lifting the steel plate, Smith felt a snap in 
his back and experienced pain down his right leg. (R. at 15.) 
3. Smith's back did not hurt much, but he experienced 
pain and a burning sensation in his right leg. (R. at 15, 19.) 
4. Smith did not testify that the steel plate was diffi-
cult or awkward to lift. (R. at 9-45.) 
-3-
5. The following day Smith consulted a chiropractor, 
Kenneth G. Hansen, about his back injury. (R. at 243, 245, 
291.) Smith received massage, heat and chiropractic adjust-
ments from Hansen every other day for seven weeks. (R. at 
19-21.) 
6. On May 9, 1986, Smith was examined by Dr. Alan T. 
Hunstock, who later admitted Smith to the Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center for corrective back surgery. (R. at 22 and 208.) 
7. Since the surgery, Smith joined a bowling league for 
the first time. (R. at 41.) 
8. At the hearing, Smith denied that he had back problems 
prior to the lifting incident of March 25, 1986, (R. at 295). 
However, the medical records clearly demonstrates that Smith 
suffered a serious low back injury in 1980 when he bent over an 
automobile fender at work. At that time he felt something snap 
in his back with pain radiating down both legs. (R. at 94, 
107-31, 220-23, 283, 292.) 
9. As a result of that injury, Smith consulted Dr. John P. 
Mendenhall, who admitted Smith to the hospital on April 10, 
1980 for severe low back pain. (R. at 94, 252.) Following the 
hospitalization Smith continued to see Dr. Mendenhall. (R. at 
35, 94-100, 121-32, 218-223.) Smith also received extensive 
physical therapy and a transcutaneous nerve stimulator. (R. at 
121-31, 125, 130, 221, 233.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission's legal determination of what 
standard should be used to establish legal causation is fully 
reviewable by this Court. 
Because Smith suffered a back injury in 1980, he must prove 
that lifting fifty pounds from his knee to waist contributed 
something substantial to the risks he already faced in everyday 
life; otherwise he cannot establish that he suffered a compen-
sable industrial accident. Although the Commission concluded 
that Smith's lifting of fifty pounds constituted unusual and 
extraordinary exertion sufficient to satisfy the legal causa-
tion requirement, current case law and authorities present a 
contrasting view. Indeed, the lifting incident in the instant 
case is similar to and less exertive than nonemployment activi-
ties recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Accordingly, Smith's 
lifting incident did not contribute anything substantial to the 
risks he already faced in everyday life and did not involve 
unusual or extraordinary exertion. Thus, Smith's lifting 
incident cannot satisfy the legal causation requirement for a 




THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES LEGAL 
CAUSATION IS FULLY REVIEWABLE BY THIS COURT. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 20 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a two-part causation test 
to determine whether an incident constitutes a compensable 
industrial accident under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1986). 
The Court noted that "compensable injuries can best be identi-
fied by first considering the legal cause of injury." (Emphasis 
added.) Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. See also Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation § 38-83(a) at 7-273 (1986). The Court further 
observed that "[u]nder the legal test, the law must define what 
kind of exertion satisfies the test of arising out of the 
employment.'" Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. Thus the question of 
legal causation is a question of law. As such, it can "be 
reviewed by this Court with no deference to the Commission." 
Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 1984). 
See also Board of Education v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984). 
POINT II 
SMITH'S LIFTING INCIDENT DOES NOT SATISFY 
THE LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD NECESSARY FOR A 
COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
A. Where An Employee Suffers From A Pre-Existing Condition 
Aggravated By Employment Activities, He Must Show That 
The Employment Activity Contributed Something Substan-
tial To Increase The Risk He Already Faced In Everyday 
Life Because Of His Condition. 
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Where an injured employee suffers from a preexisting 
condition aggravated by employment, the employee must prove 
legal causation. 
[T]o meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a preexisting condition must show that the employ-
ment contributed something substantial to increase the 
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition. This additional element of risk in the 
workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This 
extra exertion serves to offset the preexisting condi-
tion of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, 
thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting 
from a personal risk rather than exertions at work. 
(Emphas is added.) 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25; and Larson, Supra., at § 38.83(b), at 
7-278. This higher standard of proof required of employees 
with preexisting conditions screens out claims for injuries 
that result from personal risk or the normal wear and tear of 
everyday life. 
B. Smith Suffered From A Pre-Existing Condition 
Aggravated By His Lifting Incident. 
Although Smith denied having a preexisting low back 
condition (R. at 25), the medical records and Medical Panel 
Report establish that he did have such a pre-existing condition 
which required substantial medical treatment. (R. at 220-23, 
282-283.) See also Addendum "E." Without hesitation, the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission acknowl-
edged that Smith suffered from "a previous back condition" 
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aggravated by the March 1986 lifting incident. (R. at 305.) 
Accordingly, to establish legal causation in this case, Smith 
must demonstrate that the task of lifting a 50 pound steel 
plate from knee level to his waist "contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday 
life because of his [preexisting] condition." Id. at 25. 
C. Smith's Lifting Incident Did Not Constitute 
Extraordinary Exertion. 
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court determined that Allen was 
lifting several loads of dairy products, weighing from 33 to 50 
pounds not including the weight of the containers and crates in 
which the products were contained, at the time he injured his 
back. Under these circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that: 
[s]ince the claimant had previous back problems, to 
meet the legal causation requirement he must show that 
moving and lifting several piles of dairy products 
weighing 30 to 50 pounds [exclusive of the weight of 
crates] in the confined area of the cooler exceeded 
the exertion that the average person typically 
undertakes in non-employment life. (Emphasis added.) 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 28. After reviewing the facts the Court 
could not find that Allen's activities satisfied the legal 
causation test. Thus, the Court remanded to allow the claimant 
an opportunity to establish additional evidence on the legal 
causation issue. 
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In this case Smith only lifted fifty pounds one and a half 
feet from his knees to his waist in an unobstructed area. This 
is less exertive than the activities in Allen. Since the more 
exertive Allen activities did not establish legal causation, 
the less exertive activities of Smith do not either. 
Other courts have determined that lifting heavier objects 
than the steel plates in the instant case is normal for non-
employment life. 
In Newbanks v. Foursome Package and Bar, Inc., 201 Neb. 
818, 272 N.W.2d 372 (1978), a bartender/manager suffered neck, 
chest and arm pains while lifting a 60 pound case of whiskey. 
He was diagnosed as having arterial sclerosis and angina. This 
condition pre-existed and was aggravated by the lifting inci-
dent. The Compensation Board held that "the degree of exertion 
demonstrated by the evidence was not greater than that found in 
nonemployment life. ..." Id. at 374. The Nebraska Supreme 
Court affirmed the Board's decision. 
In Hyatt v. Kay Windsor, Inc., 198 Neb. 580, 254 N.W.2d 92 
(1977), a traveling sales representative suffered a heart 
attack while loading four 80 pound sample bags into his car. 
He had pre-existing heart problems. The Workmen's Compensation 
Court denied the claim because the injury resulted from natural 
causes, not from carrying the 80 pound sample bags. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the claimant 
failed to establish necessary causation. 
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The Administrative Law Judge's reliance on Giles v. 
Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) to support a 
finding of legal causation in this case was inappropriate. 
Giles suffered from a preexisting eye condition. He attempted 
to lift the door of a milk delivery truck which had become 
jammed. While "jerking on the jammed door," Giles retina 
became detached. Later it took a power jack to lift the door 
far enough to enable a boy to crawl under it and remove the 
obstruction. Smith's lifting of fifty pounds one and a half 
feet from his knee to his waist is in no way comparable to 
Giles' tremendous exertion in "jerking" on an immovable object. 
D. Smith's Activity Is Similar To And Less Exertive Than 
Typical Non-Employment Activities Recognized By The 
Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court declared that typical non-employment 
activities and exertions of men and women today "include taking 
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying luggage 
for travel, and changing a flat tire on an automobile [and] 
lifting a small child to chest height. ..." Allen 729 P.2d 
at 26. (Emphasis added.) 
In attempting to apply the Allen "typical non-employment 
activities" standards in the instant case, Judge Moffitt and 
the Industrial Commission concluded that "[t]he lifting of an 
awkward steel plate which weighs approximately 50 pounds from a 
level which is approximately between the applicant's waist and 
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knees seems to . . . [be] a somewhat unusual exertion . . . , 
(R. at 293) "that goes beyond what typically is required in 
non-employment life in general." (R. at 306,) 
Neither Judge Moffitt nor the Industrial Commission state 
any reason why Smith's lifting incident differs from or 
requires more exertion than "the typical activities and non-
employment exertions" enumerated in Allen, except for (1) the 
Commission's conclusory and unsubstantiated statement that 
"[t]he Commission does not believe men and women typically lift 
50 pounds," even though the Commission acknowledges that some 
items listed by the Supreme Court (garbage cans and tires) "may 
weigh 50 pounds;" and (2) the Commission's mischaracterization 
and incorrect conclusion that Smith's lifting incident was 
awkward. (R. at 306.) 
In contrast to the Commission's conclusory determination, a 
detailed comparison of Smith's lifting activities with the 
typical non-employment activities recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court demonstrates that Smith's lifting incident is 
similar and sometimes less exertive than the non-employment 
activities listed in Allen. 
For example, "taking a full garbage can to the street" may 
typically involve lifting more than 50 pounds. Depending on 
the dimensions of the garbage can, the task will require 
hunching and awkward positioning while walking. In contrast, 
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grasping a thin 14 inch wide steel plate and lifting it one and 
a half feet from knee level to the waist is less awkward and 
less exertive. Furthermore, lifting such a steel plate would 
not require hunching and awkward positioning. Unlike a garbage 
can, the steel plate could be balanced. 
"Lifting and carrying" baggage for travel is often more 
exertive and awkward than Smith's lifting. Carrying baggage 
may also involve lifting greater weight. Furthermore, carrying 
typical baggage is a one hand task. Thus, one may carry a 
heavy bag in either hand along with an additional bag over the 
shoulder. The steel plate could be carried in two hands. 
"Changing a flat tire on an automobile" may typically be 
more awkward and exertive than Smith's lifting incident. [The 
Commission neglected the fact that the Supreme Court spoke of 
changing a flat tire, not just lifting a tire.] Changing a 
tire involves reaching into awkward compartments to remove 
equipment, using a jack to elevate heavy automobiles, removing 
and tightening lug nuts, awkwardly lifting spare tires from 
storage compartments, and then placing them on the axle. Then 
the entire process must be reversed. Smith's lifting a metal 
plate one and a half feet from his knees to his waist seems 
insignificant when compared to changing a flat tire on an 
automobile. 
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Lifting a small child to chest height may also be more 
exertive and awkward. Small children are different shapes and 
sizes, with no particular center of gravity, making them 
somewhat awkward to lift. Children's movements are unpredict-
able making it difficult to lift and balance them at chest 
height. In addition, lifting a child to chest height could 
require more exertion than lifting a thin, flat, non-mobile 
object from knee to waist height only. 
Finally, the exertion involved in Smith's lifting incident 
is similar and in some cases requires less exertion than other 
typical non-employment activities such as lifting and carrying 
50 pound bags of salt to fill water softeners, lifting and 
carrying gardening and landscaping materials such as bags of 
fertilizer, wheelbarrows or machinery, exercising with weights 
or rowing machines, carrying cement bags and fencing materials, 
and bowling. 
Under these circumstances, the Industrial Commission 
committed reversible error by concluding that Smith's lifting 
incident contributed something substantial to the risks he 
already faced in everyday life. Indeed, under the Allen list 
of nonemployment activities, there was nothing unusual or 
extraordinary in the exertion and manner in which Smith lifted 
the steel plate from knee level to his '*aist. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs/appellants Sisco Hilte 
and Zurich American Insurance Company respectfully request this 
Court to reverse the Commission's decision and award in all 
respects. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Lar^y R. Laycock 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Utah Code Ann, § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1986): 
COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS TO BE PAID, 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured, and the dependents of every such employee who 
is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if 
the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall 
be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of 
the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in 
this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and 
medicines, and funeral services provided under this 
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance 
carrier and not on the employee. 
EXHIBIT A-l 
ADDENDUM "B" 
Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of 
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance 
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defend-
ants. 
No. 20026. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 14, 1986. 
Worker, who sustained lower back in-
juries while stacking milk crates containing 
four to six gallons of milk, sought review 
of an order of the Industrial Commission, 
denying his motion for review of an order 
of an administrative law judge denying his 
workers' compensation claim. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that (1) 
finding that worker's injury was not "by 
accident" was not based on the evidence 
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's 
claim would be remanded for further fact 
finding as to whether action of worker, 
who had previous back problems, in lifting 
several piles of milk crates exceeded exer-
tion which average person typically under-
took in nonemployment life and whether 
medically demonstrable causal link existed 
between worker's lifting and injury to his 
back. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Hall, CJ., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart, 
Associate C.J., joining in the dissent 
Stewart, Associate CJ., dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Evidence <s»18 
Supreme Court took judicial notice that 
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid 
water or approximately eight and one-third 
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the 
containers and crate, and six gallons of 
milk weigh about 50 pounds without con-
tainers and crate. 
ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COMN Utah 15 
Cite as 729 ?2d I5 (Utah 1986) 
2. Workers' Compensation s»515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, key requirement of an "accident" is 
that occurrence be unanticipated, un-
planned, and unintended; where either 
cause of injury or result of exertion is 
different from what would normally be ex-
pected to occur, occurrence is unplanned, 
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 
"accident"; clarifying Catling v. Industri-
al Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 
202. U.C.A.1953, 3&-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Workers' Compensation @»515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, proof of unusual event may be helpful 
m determining C2usa) connection between 
injury and employment; however, proof of 
unusual event is not required as an element 
of requirement that injury be "by acci-
dent" U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation e»515 
An "accident" for purposes of require-
ment that injury be "by accident" to be 
compensable under Workers' Compensation 
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occur-
rence that may be either the cause or the 
result of an injury; abandoning Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283; 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooper-
ative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah); 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar-
<ingo, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.CA.1953, 
3&-1-45. 
5. Workers' Compensation <3=»568 
Key question in workers' compensation 
case in determining causation is whether, 
given worker's body and worker's exertion, 
the exertion in fact contributed to the inju-
ry. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
6. Workers' Compensation <*=»552, 568 
Only those injuries which occur be-
cause some condition or exertion required 
by employment increases risk of injury 
EXHIBIT B - l 
16 Utah 729 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
which worker normally faces in his every-
day life is compensable under Workers' 
Compensation Act; injuries which coinci-
dentally occur at work because preexisting 
condition results in symptoms which appear 
during work hours without any enhance-
ment from the work place are not compen-
sable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
7. Workers' Compensation <s=>597 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, two-part causation test, requiring con-
sideration of legal cause and medical cause 
of injury, is required in determining wheth-
er causal connection exists between injury 
and worker's employment; abandoning 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Church of Je-
sus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Indus-
trial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah); 
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construc-
tion and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robert-
son v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memori-
al Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah); Schmidt v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah); Residential and 
Commercial Construction Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Indus-
trial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
8. Workers1 Compensation &=*553 
Where claimant suffers from preexist-
ing condition which contributes to injury, 
unusual or extraordinary exertion is re-
quired to prove "legal causation," for pur-
poses of two-part causation test for deter-
mining whether causal connection exists 
between claimant's injury and claimant's 
employment; where there is no preexisting 
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is 
sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A. 
2953, 35-1-45. 
9, Workers' Compensation <s»597 
For purposes of legal causation ele-
ment of two-part test for determining 
whether causal connection exists between 
claimant's injury and claimant's employ-
ment, precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with usual wear and tear and exer-
tions of nonemployment life of people in 
general, not nonemployment life of the par-
ticular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953, 
3&-1-45. 
10. Workers' Compensation <s»597 
Under medical causation portion of 
two-part test for determining whether 
causal connection exists between claimant's 
injury and claimant's employment, claimant 
must show by evidence, opinion, or other-
wise that stress, strain, or exertion re-
quired by his or her occupation led to re-
sulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
H. Workers' Compensation <s=>1390 
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness 
of employee's exertions may be relevant to 
medical conclusion of causal connection be-
tween claimant's injury and claimant's em-
ployment. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
12. Workers' Compensation e=>1533 
Finding that claimant's lower back in-
jury was not "by accident" as claimant was 
stacking milk crates was not based on the 
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claim-
ant experienced unexpected and unantic-
ipated injury to his back as he lifted crate 
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant 
had not complained of pain or limitations at 
his job, and no evidence indicated that inju-
ry was predictable or developed gradually 
as with occupational disease or progressive 
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
13. Workers' Compensation <s=>1950 
Compensation claim of worker, who 
had preexisting back problems and sus-
tained lower back injuries while stacking 
crates containing four to six gallons of 
milk, was remanded for further fact find-
ing on issue as to whether moving and 
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lifting several piles of crates weighing 30 
to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler 
exceeded exertion average person typically 
undertook in nonemployment life and 
whether there was medically demonstrable 
causal link between worker's action in lift-
ing milk crates and injury to his back and, 
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose 
out of or in the course of employment" 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Sec-
ond Injury. 
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt 
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review 
from the Industrial Commission's denial of 
his motion for review of an administrative 
law judge order denying him compensation 
for a back injury sustained at work. For 
the reasons stated below, we reverse and 
remand. 
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claim-
ant, aged 36, was employed as night man-
ager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testi-
fied to the following version of events at a 
hearing before an administrative law 
judge. The claimant was working in a 
confined cooler in the store stacking crates, 
containing four to six gallons1 of milk, 
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While 
lifting one crate to about chest level, he 
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower 
back. He immediately set down the crate 
and asked another employee to continue 
stocking the shelves. The claimant com-
pleted the one-half hour remaining in his 
shift doing desk work. That night the pain 
increased, and by morning his left leg felt 
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr. 
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Ini-
tial doctor visits during December were 
followed through with the prescribed treat-
1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs 
about the same as liquid water or approximately 
8'/3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-
STRIAL COM'N Utah 17 
IS (Utah 1986) 
ment of bed rest and medication. A myelo-
gram finally revealed a herniated disc, and 
the claimant spent ten days in tractidn in 
the hospital in early January. He did not 
return to work. 
The claimant also testified he had a histo-
ry of prior back injuries, including a fall 
from a telephone pole at age fourteen 
which required him to wear a back brace 
for several months, a back injury in 1977 
while lifting sand bags for the Logan 
School District, and another fall while 
working for that employer when he slipped 
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his 
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted 
in prolonged absences from work. 
The testimony from other sources varied 
slightly from the report given by the claim-
ant. The employer's report of injury de-
scribes the accident as "picking up freight 
and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes 
and stacking them from truck.'' No specif-
ic event was mentioned in the employer's 
report. The medical records of treating 
physicians described the claimant's previ-
ous injuries, but omitted any reference to a 
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan, 
who examined the claimant on December 
31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember 
any distinct episode as having precipitated 
his current problem, however." And in a 
letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated 
January 13, 1983, the claimant's history 
was related as follows: "About six weeks 
ago, however, he was lifting material at 
work, and recalls no specific injury or 
stress but developed discomfort in his left 
groin area which ultimately extended into 
his big toe." 
The administrative law judge found that 
the claimant's injury to his back on Novem-
ber 23. 1982, was not "an injury by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of 
employment" It is apparent that the ad-
ministrative law judge, using a specific epi-
sode analysis, concluded there was no "ac-
cident" because there was no identifiable 
miners and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh 
approximately 50 pounds without the containers 
and crate. 
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event that caused the injury and because 
lifting the crates of milk was * routine 2&d 
commonplace exertion expected of the job. 
The administrative law judge analogized 
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980), where a gradually developed back 
injury was held to be not compensable 
where the condition worsened without the 
intervention of any external occurrence or 
trauma. 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
claimant, who had suffered preexisting 
back problems and was injured as the re-
sult of an exertion usual and typical for his 
job, was injured "by accident arising out of 
or in the course of employment" as re-
quired by the Workers' Compensation Act, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986). That 
Act, in pertinent part, provides: 
Every employee . . . who is injured . •. 
by accident arising out of or iiv tte 
course of his employment . . . shall be 
paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury 
Id This statute creates two prerequisites 
for a finding of a compensable injury. 
First, the injury must be "by accident." 
Second, the language "arising out of or in 
the course of employment" requires that 
there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment. See Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior deci-
sions by this Court have often failed to 
distinguish the analysis of the accident 
question from the discussion of causation 
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the 
Commission are faced with confusing and 
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea-
2. We note that many of our prior opinions so 
mtexmingitd \ht causation and accident anafy-
ses that it is impossible to segregate them and 
determine the basis for the Court's decision. 
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982). mixes the acci-
dent and causation elements in the following 
language: 'It appears to be mere coincidence 
that defendant's injury ... occurred at work. 
Defendant bears the burden of showing other-
wise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties 
of employment to unexpected injury is simply 
lacking [T]he Commission's conclusion 
that an accident occurred is without any sub-
son we now undertake a fresh look at the 
polky TKA historiral background of the 
workers' compensation statute in an at-
tempt to provide a clear and workable rule 
for future application by the Commission. 
I. 
The term "by accident" is not defined in 
the workers' compensation statutes. The 
most frequently referenced authority for 
the definition of "by accident" is the case 
of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), where the 
term was defined as follows: 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in the usual course of events 
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
preclude tte possibility that dvte to exer-
tion, stress or other repetitive cause, a 
climax might be reached in such manner 
as to properly fall within the definition of 
an accident as just stated above. How-
ever, such an occurrence must be distin-
guished from gradually developing condi-
tions which are classified as occupational 
diseases 
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones 
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and 
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)). 
Some confusion has developed as to wheth-
er "by accident" requires proof of an un-
usual event. This issue frequently arises 
when the employee suffers an internal fail-
ure3 brought about by exertions in the 
stantive support in the record." Id at 726 (foot-
notes omfttedY See aiso Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 
P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276r 382 P.2d 414 (1963). 
For an example of an opinion which does sepa-
rate the accident and causation analysis, see 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328. 330-31 (Utah 
1979) (Wiikins, J., dissenting). 
3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of 
injuries that arise from general organ or struc-
tural failure brought about by an exertion in the 
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our 
cases have defined "by accident" to include 
internal failures resulting from both usual 
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah 1980). 
This Court first discussed the term "by 
accident" in Tintic Milling Co, v. Industri-
al Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278 
(1922), where an accident was said to be 
"something out of the ordinary, unex-
pected, and definitely located as to time 
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281. 
This definition was used to distinguish inju-
ries which occurred gradually and were 
covered under statutory provisions for oc-
cupational disease. Id. The Court in Tin-
tic Milling also acknowledged that where 
the claimant suffers an internal failure the 
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal 
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] 
A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is 
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling 
observed: 
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, 
nothing more is required than that the 
harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected It is enough 
that the causes, themselves known and 
usual, should produce a result which on 
a particular occasion is neither designed 
nor expected. The test as to whether an 
injury is unexpected, and so, if received 
on a single occasion, occurs 'by accident,' 
is that the sufferer did not intend or 
expect that injury would on that particu-
lar occasion result from what he was 
doing." 
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Boh-
len, A Problem in The Drafting of Work-
men 's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev. 
328, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accord-
ingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a find-
ing that the employee, whose previous res-
piratory problems were aggravated by en-
tering a roasting flue, had suffered a com-
pensable accident. 
workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by 
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and 
back injuries. See generally, Mote, Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabili-
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After Tintic Milling, the Court tempo-
rarily rejected the "unexpected result" def-
inition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal 
failure cases on the ground that the defini-
tion of "by accident" required an unusual 
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. 
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensa-
tion to a worker who unexpectedly suf-
fered a heart attack while manually unload-
ing a railroad car of coal on the ground 
that no overexertion occurred during the 
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104. 
That decision was apparently overruled, 
however, when the Court embraced the 
"unexpected result" rule and awarded com-
pensation to an employee who suffered a 
heart attack after overexertions while rou-
tinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir. 
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Mof-
fat, J., concurring). Hammond was fol-
lowed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 
(1937), where a unanimous Court held that 
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured 
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over 
rough ground, suffered an injury "by acci-
dent" since the result was "an unusual, 
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occur-
rence" and definite as to time and place. 
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas 
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of 
benefits to a claimant who had suffered 
from heart disease and experienced a heart 
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes 
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of 
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy 
and greatly in excess of his ordinary 
duties. The Court pointed out in dicta, 
that the English common law would have 
awarded compensation even if the exer-
tions were ordinary and usually required as 
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 
P.2d at 235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen 
article, supra, the Court observed: 
ty under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A 
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse"?, 
1981 Utah LRev. 393. 
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"[Nothing more is required than that 
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected The element of 
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'ac-
cident1 is sufficiently supplied . . . if, 
though the act is usual and the condi-
tions normal, it causes a harm unfore-
seen by him who suffers it" 
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237. 
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly 
adopted the English rule for the definition 
of an accident and awarded benefits to a 
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back 
while stepping on the brake pedal of a 
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activi-
ty. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. 
After summarizing early Utah cases inter-
preting "by accident" the Court concluded 
that "since 1922 this court has uniformly 
held that an unexpected internal failure 
meets the requirements of ["by accident"] 
4. The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned 
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373, 
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion errone-
ously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never been 
cited by this or any other court to support the 
law of that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 ?2d at 
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been 
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine 
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. Corp. v. 
Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204, 
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion 
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant 
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave & 
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296 
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) (Purity Biscuit cited 
as stating majority position that usual exertion 
causing an internal failure may be by accident); 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 
231 Cal.App.2d HI. 41 CaLRptr. 628, 635 (1964) 
(relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit); 
Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So2d 308, 314 
(Fla.1962) (back herniation from rupture of in-
tervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement 
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis SL Ry.t 
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964) 
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered work-
men's compensation case" that supported an 
award where many factors led to the disability); 
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont 198, 208, 
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably 
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave, 
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40. and 
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a 
compensable injury where the causal relation-
ship is established); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 
10 NJ. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) (Al-
and the legislature by failing to amend has 
acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah 
at 15, 201 P.2d at 968. 
The holding of Purity Biscuit also 
squarely embraced the concept that an or-
dinary or usual exertion that results in an 
unexpected injury is compensable. See 115 
Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. After 
carefully considering the legislative pur-
pose of the workers' compensation statute, 
prior precedent, and public policy, the 
Court rejected the requirement that proof 
of an unusual activity or exertion be a 
required element of the "by accident" defi-
nition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 
967-70. The Court concluded that "there 
is nothing in the statute which would justi-
fy a holding that an injury is compensable 
where overexertion is shown but is not 
compensable where only ordinary exertion 
is shown, provided that in both cases it is 
shown that the exertion causes the inju-
ry." 4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970. 
rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal 
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an 
"injury by accident"); Olson v. State Indust 
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d 
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially con-
curring) (dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Coo* 
per v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 747, 
750-51 (1950) (Purity Biscuit cited as an exam-
ple of the divergent viewpoints for defining a 
compensable accident). 
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was 
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases. 
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah 
612, 244 P.2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial 
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 ?2& 202; 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the 
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen 
concluded without further discussion that "(t]he 
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a healthy 
reappraisement" 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 ?2d at 
800. Two years later in Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the 
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis 
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and 
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse." 
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 P.2d at 286. After 
considering those cases from Utah and other 
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit, 
we now cannot agree that it was a "living 
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay 
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. In-
dustrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 
1980). 
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases 
have held that an internal injury may be 
compensable if it results from either a 
usual or unusual exertion in the course of 
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home 
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer 
caused by lifting an unusually heavy 
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v. 
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and 
unanticipated heart attack resulting from 
exertion while inspecting roof structure); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1981) (back injur}' resulting from 
shoveling coal compensable despite usual-
ness of activity and presence of preexisting 
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting 
from moving heavy boxes and installing 
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industri-
al Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) 
(back injury resulting from carrying steel 
plates compensable despite prior history of 
back disorders and ordinary activity); 
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack result-
ing from exertion while rushing to drown-
ing accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack re-
sulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roo-
sendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver 
suffered heart attack after repeatedly 
climbing long steps); Residential & Com-
mercial Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) 
(back injury resulting from moving lum-
ber); Powers v. Industrial Commission, 
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart 
distress occurring over a period of several 
months compensable despite preexisting 
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) 
(back injury resulting from filing papers in 
lower drawer compensable). 
Despite the strong precedential support 
for applying the "unexpected result" rule 
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases, 
a separate line of opposing authority has 
developed which requires overexertion or 
an unusual event to prove an injury oc-
curred "by accident." Typically, these 
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cases denied compensation because the 
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitat-
ed the injury. Consequently, there were no 
events or exertions that were unusual or 
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident/' 
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar-
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensa-
tion for knee injury denied where circum-
stances precipitating the injury were com-
monplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic 
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) 
(back injury from loading box of twelve 
radios into van not compensable); Farm-
er's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant 
with preexisting condition resulting from 
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensa-
ble since the activity was not unusual or 
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury 
suffered by janitor upon standing up not 
compensable without evidence that activi-
ties were unusual); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury 
precipitated by sitting and driving a mov-
ing van not compensable without proof of 
an unusual event). These cases will not be 
collectively referred to as the Redman line 
of cases. 
[2] We are now convinced that the Red-
man line of cases has misconstrued the 
historical and logical definition of "by acci-
dent" The Redman line of cases relied on 
the following abridged version of the defi-
nition of an accident found in Carling v. 
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] con-
notes an unanticipated, unintended occur-
rence different from what would normal-
ly be expected to occur in the usual 
course of events.'1 16 Utah at 261, 399 
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted 
phrase was interpreted to require an un-
usual event before there can be an acci-
dent This interpretation misconstrues the 
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent 
with the English definition of "by accident" 
used by this Court since 1922. The key 
requirement of an accident under the Car-
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ling decision, as well as prior decisions, 
was that the occurrence be unanticipated, 
unplanned and unintended. The highlight-
ed phrase emphasized that where either the 
cause of the injury or the result of an 
exertion was different from what would 
normally be expected to occur, the occur-
rence was unplanned, unforeseen, unin-
tended and therefore "by accident." 
Policy considerations also militate in fa-
vor of rejecting the notion that the phrase 
"by accident" requires an unusual event. 
There is nothing in the term "accident" 
that suggests that only that which is un-
usual is accidental. See Robertson v. In-
dustrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40, 
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring; 
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does 
not occur simply because a worker is in-
jured during an unusual activity. This ar-
gument is illustrated by Professor Larson 
in his treatise on workmen's compensation 
with the following example: 
If an employee intentionally and know-
ingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, 
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more 
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a 
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberate-
ly continues to mow the lawn in the rain, 
a passerby observing him would not say 
that he was undergoing an accident 
merely because it is unusual to mow 
lawns in the rain. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.-
62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual 
distinction as being unworkable in practice. 
Realistically, it is impossible to determine 
what are the usual and normal require-
ments of a job. People work in good 
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well 
as light ones, and work for long hours as 
well as short ones. None of these activi-
ties may be unusual or unexpected. Id. 
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168. 
The unworkability of the usual-unusual 
event requirement is further evidenced by 
comparing seemingly irreconcilable deci-
sions by this Court Compare Kaiser 
Steel v. Monfredi 631 P.2d 888 (back inju-
ry to miner Math previous back problems 
held to be a compensable accident despite 
being caused by shoveling coal in the usual 
course of employment), with Farmer's 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 
(no accident where worker with previous 
back problems sustained back injury while 
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); com-
pare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable 
accident for back injury resulting from fil-
ing paper in lower drawer) with Billings 
Computer Corp. v. Tarangof 674 P.2d 104 
(no accident where worker sustained knee 
injury resulting from bending to pick up 
small parts). 
[3,4] We believe that the Court's real 
concern in the Redman line of cases was 
the presence or absence of proof of causa-
tion to support an award of compensation. 
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wil-
kins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed 
in the next section, the Court has developed 
two parallel lines of authority on the causa-
tion issue, one of which requires an un-
usual event in order to meet the statutory 
causation requirement Although proof of 
an unusual event may be helpful in deter-
mining causation, it is not required as an 
element of "by accident" in section 35-1-
45. "[TJhe basic and indispensable ingredi-
ent of 'accident' is unexpectedness." 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We there-
fore reaffirm those cases which hold that 
an accident is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or 
the result of an injury. We thus necessar-
ily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in 
the Redman line of cases which predicates 
the "accident" determination upon the oc-
currence of an unusual event 
II. 
The second element of a compensable 
accident requires proof of a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the worker's 
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation 
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cases involving internal failures, the key 
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinari-
ly, causation is proved by the production 
and interpretation of medical evidence ei-
ther alone or together with other evidence. 
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370; 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the 
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures 
and because of the possibility that a preex-
isting condition may have contributed to 
the injury, special causation rules have 
been developed for internal failure cases. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Pu-
rity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
This Court initially responded to the 
problem of causation in internal failure 
cases by suggesting that the Commission 
use a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard when an internal failure was caused 
by an exertion in the workplace.5 See 
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. 
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 
74, 138 P.2d 233, 238 (1943). The clear and 
convincing evidence standard was rejected, 
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Com-
mission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979), 
with the rationale that such a standard 
would make workers' compensation bene-
fits nearly impossible to recover where the 
deceased suffered from a preexisting condi-
tion. Accordingly, the standard to prove 
causal connection is preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. 
The second method that has been used to 
ensure causal connection in internal failure 
cases is to require proof that an unusual 
event or activity precipitated the injury. 
Presumably, this requirement was used to 
prevent compensating a person predisposed 
to internal failure where the preexisting 
condition contributed more to the injury 
than his usual work activity. The follow-
ing internal failure cases illustrate that evi-
dence of an unusual event or activity is 
necessary to prove causation. Billings 
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is 
still used where the employee suffers from a 
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of 
STRIAL COM'N Utah 23 
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Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104, 
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Ser-
vice v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah 
1982); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food 
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construc-
tion & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); 
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. 
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industri-
al Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at 
233; see Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99 
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-
39 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Com-
mission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798, 
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30, 
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting). 
Defendants argue that any rule that 
awards compensation based on usual exer-
tion will open the floodgates for payment 
of benefits for all internal injuries that 
coincidentally occur at work. They claim 
that the unusual exertion requirement is 
necessary to prevent the employer from 
becoming a general insurer. They argue 
that without the unusual exertion rule, em-
ployment opportunities for persons with a 
history or indication of physical disability 
or handicap will be reduced. 
Despite precedent supporting the "un-
usual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us 
to follow a separate line of authority that 
awards compensation for injuries that oc-
cur during usual and ordinary workplace 
activity. These cases typically award com-
pensation where the claimant was engaged 
in a workplace activity and where there is 
adequate evidence of medical causation. 
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for com-
pensation affirmed for a coal miner's back 
injury despite absence of unusual incident); 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for 
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583. 592, 319 N.W^d 454, 458 
(1982). 
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties 
upon proof of medical causal connection 
between workplace exertions and the inju-
ry); Residential and Commercial Con-
struction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back 
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in 
the ordinary course of work compensable); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967) 
(awarding compensation to fireman for ex-
ertions in the normal course of employ-
ment—the Court rejecting the unusual ex-
ertion test in favor of ordinary exertion); 
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury 
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabi-
net compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exer-
tion rule was questioned in Mellen v. In-
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375-
76, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to 
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of 
cases. Moreover, Residential and Com-
mercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and 
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation 
for usual workplace activity after the Mel-
len decision. Clearly, the usual exertion 
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah 
law. 
When read in chronological sequence, 
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent 
and confused approach to determining 
when an accident arose out of or in the 
course of employment Much of this con-
fusion can be traced to fundamental prob-
lems stemming from the use of the usual-
unusual distinction as a means of proving 
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual 
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy 
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure 
causal connection/' Larson, supra, § 38.-
81, at 7-270. The problems in determining 
what activities were usual or unusual were 
6. Larson's observation is consistent with this 
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exer-
tion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 
16, 201 P.2d at 968: 
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will ever 
know what this court will consider sufficient 
overexertion. Also under that test if the work 
EXHIBIT 
recognized as long ago as 1949 when Jus-
tice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of 
difficulties . . . may be opened by the re-
finements between usual and unusual, ex-
ertion and overexertion, ordinary and ex-
traordinary exertion measured by the indi-
vidual involved or by the industrial func-
tion performed by him or both." Purity 
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The con-
tents of the Pandora's box feared by Jus-
tice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora 
of our cases struggling with a definition of 
a compensable accident based upon the 
usualness or ordinariness of an activity. 
Professor Larson has also criticized the 
usual-unusual distinction because the ordi-
nariness of the activity fails to consider 
that some occupations routinely require a 
usual exertion capable of causing injury. 
Likewise, other occupations, such as desk-
work, require so little physical effort that 
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient 
to prove that the resulting accident arose 
out of the employment Larson, supra, 
§ 38.81, at 7-270.6 
[5] Because we find the present use of 
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and 
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take 
this opportunity to examine an alternative 
causation analysis that may better meet 
the objectives of the workers' compensa-
tion laws. We are mindful that the key 
question in determining causation is wheth-
er, given this body and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to the injury. 
Id § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J.f 
concurring specially). 
[6] The language "arising out of or in 
the course of his employment" found in 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was 
apparently intended to ensure that compen-
sation is only awarded where there is a 
usually required by the job is so great that it 
would break the strongest man even he will 
not be able to recover. But if it is more than 
usual exertion which causes the injury the 
employee can recover no matter how light the 
work is which causes the injury. 
Id. 
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sufficient causal connection between the 
disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary 
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coin-
cidentally occur at work because a preexist-
ing condition results in symptoms which 
appear during work hours without any en-
hancement from the workplace, and (b) 
those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion required by the em-
ployment increases the risk of injury which 
the worker normally faces in his everyday 
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982). Only the 
latter type of injury is compensable under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. There is no fixed 
formula by which the causation issue may 
be resolved, and the issue must be deter-
mined on the facts of each case. 
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a 
two-part causation test which is consistent 
with the purpose of our workers' compen-
sation laws and helpful in determining cau-
sation. We therefore adopt that test Lar-
son suggests that compensable injuries can 
best be identified by first considering the 
legal cause of the injury and then its medi-
cal cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at 
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must 
define what kind of exertion satisfies the 
test of 'arising out of the employment' . . . 
[then] the doctors must say whether the 
exertion (having been held legally suffi-
cient to support compensation) in fact 
7. Cases from other jurisdictions which have ac-
cepted the dual-causation standard suggested by 
Larson include: Market Foods Distribs., Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.DistCLApp.1980) 
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied 
compensation where injury could have been 
triggered at any time during normal movement 
and exertion at work not greater than typical 
nonemployment exertion); Guidry v. Sline In-
dus. Painters, Inc., 418 So2d 626 (La. 1982) 
(claimant granted compensation where injury 
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater 
than that in everyday nonemployment life); 
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 K2& 329 (Me. 
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition 
awarded compensation for back injury resulting 
from fall from his stool at work because of 
increased risk of failing where employees 
moved around him at work); Barrett v. Herbert 
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant 
with preexisting back condition denied compen-
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caused this [injury]/'7 Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(a). at 7-276 to -277. 
[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an inju-
ry arose out of or in the course of employ-
ment is difficult to determine where the 
employee brings to the workplace a person-
al element of risk such as a preexisting 
condition. Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not dis-
qualified from obtaining compensation. 
Our cases make clear that "the aggrava-
tion or lighting up of a pre-existing disease 
by an industrial accident is compensa-
ble " Powers v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the 
legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a preexisting condition must show 
that the employment contributed some-
thing substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of 
his condition. This additional element of 
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by 
an exertion greater than that undertaken in 
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion 
serves to offset the preexisting condition of 
the employee as a likely cause of the inju-
ry, thereby eliminating claims for impair-
ments resulting from a personal risk rather 
than exertions at work. Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized 
how the legal cause rule would work in 
practice as follows: 
sation for injury resulting from working at nor-
mal gait since there was no work-related en-
hancement of personal risk); Mann v. City of 
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982) 
(policeman with history of heart disease award-
ed compensation for heart attack at home 
where claimant's physician testified that attack 
was caused by stress of police work rather than 
personal risk factors); SeUens v. Allen Prods. 
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980) 
(claimant with preexisting heart problems de-
nied compensation for heart attack suffered 
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck 
trailer despite sedentary nonworking lifestyle 
using objective standard of average worker in 
nonemployment life); Couture v. Mammoth 
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181. 355 AJ2d 421 
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart prob-
lems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting 
beef medically caused the fatal heart attack). 
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If there is some personal causal contri* 
bution in the form of a [preexisting con-
dition], the employment contribution 
must take the form of an exertion great* 
er than that of nonemployment life 
If there is no personal causal contribu-
tion, that is, if there is no prior weakness 
or disease, any exertion connected with 
the employment and causally connected 
with the [injury] as a matter of medical 
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test 
of causation. 
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from 
a preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary ex-
ertion is required to prove legal causation. 
Where there is no preexisting condition, a 
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.8 
[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion 
that the comparison between the usual and 
unusual exertion be defined according to an 
objective standard. "Note that the com-
parison is not with this employee's usual 
exertion in his employment but with the 
exertions of normal nonemployment life of 
this or any other person." Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original). 
See also Johns-Manville Products v. In-
dustrial Commission, 78 I11.2d 171,178, 35 
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979) 
(compensation denied where the risk of the 
employment activity "is no greater than 
that to which he would have been exposed 
had he not been so employed"); Strickland 
8. Larson highlights the difference between the 
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we 
today adopt with the following examples of ex-
treme cases in the heart attack area: 
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting of 
200-pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift 
medically produces a heart attack. Under the 
old unusual-exertion rule there would be no 
compensation, regardless of previous heart 
condition. Under the suggested rule there 
would be compensation, even in the presence 
of a history of heart disease, because people 
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a 
part of nonemployment life, and therefore 
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordi-
nary wear and tear of life. 
Suppose Y*s job involves no lifting. Sup-
pose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job, 
and suppose there is medical testimony that 
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the 
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-
v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497, 
499 (AlauCiv.App.1977) (employment risk 
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in 
excess of that to which people not so em-
ployed are exposed f" Quoting from 
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 
701, 70S-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)). 
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.DistCt 
App.1980) (subjective test "the employ-
ment must involve an exertion greater than 
that normally performed by the employee 
during his non-employment life"). Thus, 
the precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with the usual wear and tear and 
exertions of nonemployment life, not the 
nonemployment life of the particular work-
er. 
We believe an objective standard of com-
parison will provide a more consistent and 
predictable standard for the Commission 
and this Court to follow. In evaluating 
typical nonemployment activity, the focus 
is on what typical nonemployment activities 
are generally expected of people in today's 
society, not what this particular claimant is 
accustomed to doing. Typical activities 
and exertions expected of men and women 
in the latter part of the 20th century, for 
example, include taking full garbage cans 
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage 
for travel, changing a flat tire on an auto-
mobile, lifting a small child to chest height, 
and climbing the stairs in buildings. By 
parison between this employee's usual exer-
tions and the precipitating exertion, there 
would be compensation. Under the suggested 
rule the result would depend on whether 
there was a personal causal element in the 
form of a previously weakened heart If 
there was not, compensation would be award-
ed, since the employment contributed some-
thing and the employee's personal life nothing 
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a 
previously weakened heart], compensation 
would be denied in spite of the medical causal 
contribution, because legally the personal 
causal contribution was substantial, while the 
employment added nothing to the usual wear 
and tear of life—which certainly includes lift-
ing objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags 
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders. 
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote 
omitted). 
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using an objective standard, the case law 
will eventually define a standard for typical 
"nonemployment activity" in much the way 
case law has developed the standard of 
care for the reasonable man in tort law. 
[10] 2. Medical Cause—The second 
part of Larson's dual-causation test re-
quires that the claimant prove the disability 
is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity. The purpose of the medical cause 
test is to ensure that there is a medically 
demonstrable causal link between the 
work-related exertions and the unexpected 
injuries that resulted from those strains. 
The medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims. 
With the issue being one primarily of 
causation, the importance of the . . . 
medical panel becomes manifest. It is 
through the expertise of the medical pan-
el that the Commission should be able to 
make the determination of whether the 
injury sustained by a claimant is causally 
connected or contributed to by the claim-
ant's employment. 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring). Under the medical cause test, the 
claimant must show by evidence, opinion, 
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exer-
tion required by his or her occupation led to 
the resulting injury or disability. In the 
event the claimant cannot show a medical 
causal connection, compensation should be 
denied.9 
III. 
[11] We now undertake to apply the 
foregoing analysis to the case before us. 
In reviewing findings of fact of the Indus-
trial Commission, we determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings. Champion Home 
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of 
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the 
medical conclusion of causal connection. 
Where the injury results from latent symptoms 
with an illness such as heart disease, proof of 
medical causation may be especially difficult. 
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases 
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Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1985). 
[12] We have previously stated that the 
key element of whether an injury occurred 
"by accident" is whether the injury was 
unexpected. After reviewing the record, 
we find no substantial evidence that the 
injury was not unexpected. It is clear 
from the uncontradicted testimony of the 
claimant that he experienced an unexpected 
and unanticipated injury to his back as he 
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of 
the cooler. Although the claimant had in-
jured his back on prior jobs, he had not 
complained of pain or limitations at his job 
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence 
which indicates that this injury was predict-
able or that it developed gradually as with 
an occupational disease or progressive back 
disorder. While the employer's report of 
injury and the medical records do not cor-
roborate that a sudden and identifiable in-
jury occurred in the cooler, the reports are 
unhelpful in determining whether the inju-
ry was unexpected. 
It appears that the administrative law 
judge applied the "unusual event or trau-
ma" rule in defining an accident. We have 
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on 
unexpectedness. Moreover, the adminis-
trative law judge's emphasis on prior inju-
ries is not determinative of whether an 
accident occurred. We have previously 
held that the aggravation or "lighting up" 
of a preexisting condition by an internal 
failure is a compensable accident Powers 
v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude 
therefore that the decision of the Commis-
sion that the claimant's injury was not "by 
accident" was not based on the evidence, 
and that decision is, therefore, erroneous. 
[13] The key issue in this case, like 
most internal failure cases, is whether the 
injury "arose out of or in the course of 
where compensation claims were defeated be-
cause of inadequate proof of medical causation. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321. 
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 
418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) (heart attack triggered 
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sed-
entary life of average worker compensable). 
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employment." Since the claimant had pre-
vious back problems, to meet the legal cau-
sation requirement he must show that mov-
ing and lifting several piles of dairy prod-
ucts weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the 
confined area of the cooler exceeded the 
exertion that the average person typically 
undertakes in nonemployment life. The ev-
idence presented by the claimant was insuf-
ficient for us to make a determination re-
garding legal causation. It is unclear from 
the record how many crates were moved by 
the claimant, the distance the crates were 
moved, the precise weight of the crates, 
and the size of the area in which the lifting 
and moving took place. Because the claim-
ant did not have the benefit of the fore-
going opinion, we remand for further fact-
finding on this issue. 
Moreover, the record is insufficient to 
show medical causation. It is unclear from 
the medical reports whether the doctors 
were aware of the specific incident in the 
cooler. Further, the case was not sub-
mitted to a medical panel for its evaluation. 
Without sufficient evidence of medical cau-
sation, we are unable to determine whether 
there is a medically demonstrable causal 
link between the lift in the cooler and the 
injury to the claimant's back. We there-
fore remand to the Industrial Commission 
for additional evidence and findings on the 
question of medical causation. 
The decision of the Commission is vacat-
ed and remanded. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
1 concur in remanding this case to the 
Commission for the purpose of determining 
1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
145-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). 
2. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). 
3. Emery Mining Corp. v. Defriez. 694 P.2d 606 
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 ?2d 104 (Utah 1983); 
Sabo's Eke. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981); Farmers Grain Cooperative v. Ma-
whether the work incident aggravated a 
preexisting condition such as would war-
rant an award of compensation.1 However, 
I do not join the Court in adopting an 
"unexpected result" standard to be applied 
in determining the existence of a compensa-
ble accident 
I do not believe that this Court has "mis-
construed the historical and logical" defini-
tion of "by accident" in the bulk of its 
recent cases concerning the issue at bar. 
The majority's reliance upon Purity Bis-
cuit Co. v. Industrial Commission1 is 
misplaced. The holding therein is without 
precedential value because it has been sim-
ply ignored.3 The only case in which this 
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission,4 which support 
is similarly without precedential value be-
cause it has also been ignored beginning 
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler,5 the very 
next accident case handed down. In that 
case, the Court cited and relied upon Car-
ling v. Industrial Commission * and again 
defined "accident" as an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events. In my view, Puri-
ty Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberra-
tions in our post-war case law. 
The majority opinion holds that hence-
forth an injury by accident "is an unex-
pected or unintended occurrence that may 
be either the cause or the result of an 
injury." (Emphasis in original.) However, 
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to 
establish policy, has chosen wording which 
precludes such an interpretation. The rea-
soning of Justice Latimer's dissent in Puri-
son, 606 ?2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm 'n, 
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969); Cariing v. Industrial Comm'n, 
16 Utah 2d 260,399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980). 
6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
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ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of 
the majority's interpretation. The word 
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may 
be used to denote both an unexpected oc-
currence which produces injury as well as 
an unexpected injury. The word "injury," 
on the other hand, denotes a result and not 
a cause. Had the legislature only used the 
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., 
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover 
all results regardless of the cause. Had 
the legislature only used the word "acci-
dent," then I would agree with the majori-
ty's holding today that the legislature in-
tended to cover both the cause and the 
result. In fact, however, the legislature 
has used both words "injury" and "acci-
dent." It follows that the word "accident" 
must be interpreted as focusing upon the 
cause and not the result. In short, the 
majority's interpretation writes the word 
"injury" out of the statute. Such a deci-
sion is unwarranted in my view. 
The legislature recently amended section 
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the stan-
dard which limits the payment of compen-
sation to those injured "by accident arising 
out of or in the course of . . . employ-
ment." 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by 
accident" standard has not been altered or 
amended since its inception in 1917.9 The 
legislature thus being satisfied with the 
Court's interpretation of the term "acci-
dent" in the long line of cases beginning 
with Carling v. Industrial Commission,10 
I decline to embark upon a new effort to 
redefine that term. 
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting). 
I dissent The majority defines the stat-
utory term "accident" to mean "unex-
pected result," regardless of whether it is 
produced by a usual or an unusual event. 
The majority also defines the term "arising 
out of or in the course of employment" to 
7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah 
Laws 610. 610. 
8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 4B, 1974 
ed.. Supp.1986). 
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impose legal and medical causation require-
ments. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. 
Curiously, the requirement of "legal cau-
sation" has two different meanings, de-
pending upon the physical condition of the 
worker at the time he is injured. A worker 
having no preexisting medical condition or 
handicap need only prove that the accident 
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exer-
tion." But for congenitally handicapped 
persons and for persons who have suffered 
preexisting industrial injuries (which pre-
sumably have left the worker with some 
physical weakness or deterioration), legal 
causation has a different meaning. Such a 
worker may receive compensation only if 
the "employment contribution" to the inter-
nal breakdown is "greater than that of 
nonemployment life." According to the 
majority, such a worker must now prove 
that his internal breakdown was caused by 
"an unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
in order to establish the requisite legal 
causation, even though the majority opin-
ion itself criticizes at length the "usual-un-
usual distinction as a means of proving 
causation." How the majority can reject 
that standard for persons having no preex-
isting condition, yet embrace that standard 
for persons with preexisting conditions, is 
baffling. 
Furthermore, the difference between the 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which 
a worker with a preexisting condition must 
demonstrate and the "usual exertion" 
which a person with no preexisting condi-
tion must demonstrate is far from clear. 
The latter standard is to be judged with 
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment 
life of this or any other person.'" The 
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating 
exertion must be compared with the usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life, not the nonemployment life 
of the particular worker." What the term 
"usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment" means is not defined by the 
9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917 
Utah Laws 306, 322-23. 
10. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
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majority. The few examples set out do 
little to explain the concept aimed at, other 
than to suggest that the term means some-
thing more than simple, life-sustaining ac-
tivities. 
I wholly fail to understand why persons 
who have a preexisting condition should be 
placed in the disadvantaged position, in-
deed the near-remediless position, that the 
majority opinion imposes upon them. The 
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to 
provide compensation for workers who 
have preexisting medical conditions and 
therefore run a greater risk of injury when 
they expose themselves to the hazards of 
the work place. But the law should en-
courage such persons to work rather than 
encouraging them to abandon the work 
force for some kind of unearned support. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Second Injury Fund was designed to en-
courage employers to hire persons with 
preexisting conditions by spreading the 
risk throughout the industry to assure such 
persons that their injuries will be cared for 
without imposing extraordinary liabilities 
on the employers who hire them. Inter-
mountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. 
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504, 
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to 
favor those policies which encourage peo-
ple to work, rather than policies that deter 
employers from offering gainful employ-
ment to those who have a higher risk of 
work-related injury. There is little person-
al or social benefit from a policy that tends 
to discourage persons from working be-
cause of prior injuries or disabilities. 
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and 
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes 
of the workmen's compensation laws to 
impose higher standards for compensation 
on those with preexisting medical condi-
tions than on those without Tort law gen-
erally does not do so. A defendant in a 
negligence action is required to take the 
victim as the defendant finds him; whatev-
er unusual vulnerabilities the victim may 
have are disregarded. That principle 
should not be, and until now has not been, 
different in workmen's compensation law, 
which is really a substitute for tort law 
remedies. In short, handicapped or previ-
ously injured persons who are injured by 
an industrial accident are simply discrimi-
nated against by having to meet the majori-
ty's rigorous legal cause requirement. 
I am also unable to understand how an 
administrative law judge, the Industrial 
Commission, or an appellate court is sup-
posed to determine what "typical nonem-
ployment activities" are "in today's socie-
ty," as they now must do for the purpose 
of determining legal causation for workers 
with preexisting medical conditions. Does 
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old 
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does 
during his or her nonemployment activi-
ties? Is it what a professional football 
player does in his leisure time or what a 
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary 
worker does in his or her off-hours or what 
a forest ranger does? 
Instead of defining a meaningful stan-
dard, the majority provides examples which 
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated 
principle. The examples "include taking 
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the 
stairs in buildings." These few examples, 
which I find to be arguable in any event 
since they reflect only what some people 
may do from time to time, do not substitute 
for a legal standard. I seriously wonder 
whether changing a flat tire on an automo-
bile is a typical activity in today's society, 
and I do not know how much luggage the 
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or 
she carries it The point is that the majori-
ty has not set forth a workable standard at 
all. In fact I have serious doubt that such 
an artificial construct as "typical nonem-
ployment activities" will produce more fair 
and rational decisions than our past cases. 
The majority simply assumes a "typical" 
individual for the purpose of establishing a 
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabili-
ties happen to real people, not to "average" 
people, and the law has always recognized 
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as much. In short, I do not think that the 
majority's newly established standard will 
produce decisions one whit more consistent 
or rational than those produced in the 
past1 
The majority also holds that an injured 
person must prove that the disability is 
"medically the result of an exertion or inju-
ry that occurred during a work-related ac-
tivity/' With a degree of hope that I think 
is unwarranted, the majority states that 
"[t]he medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims." I am fearful that that 
hope is seriously misplaced. 
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the 
source of the Court's new standards and 
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of 
law, but there is much to be said for the 
case-by-case approach in hammering out 
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion 
produce inconsistencies. I readily concede 
that present law needs to be rationalized 
and that some cases should be overruled 
because they are hopelessly inconsistent 
with other cases, but I do not believe that 
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a 
manner as to defeat those humane policies 
intended to allow for the injuries of work-
ers who come to the work place in an 
impaired condition. 
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent 
1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are 
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring 
exceptions and most of them prior to 1980. 
That there are more inconsistencies the further 
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Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Richard E. Hollo-
way Trucking [Employer], and the 
State Insurance Fund [Insurance carri-
er for the Employer], Defendants. 
No. 20621. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 21, 1986. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R. 
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a self-
employed truck driver. On July 11, 1984, 
after driving for about six hours, he 
stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he 
slipped while walking across an oil spill on 
his way to the restroom and that the slip 
caused him to jerk to regain his balance. Af-
ter returning from the restroom, Holloway 
bent over to inspect one of his truck tires. 
While crouching, he experienced an imme-
diate sharp pain in his back which made 
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms 
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver, 
drove for the rest of the trip. Two days 
after the incident Holloway consulted a chi-
ropractor in Georgia. He consulted anoth-
er chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake 
City. The slip on the oil spill was not 
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors 
who examined Holloway, in the First Re-
port of Injury, or in the claimant's report 
of how the injury occurred. 
The Commission denied review of the 
administrative law judge's order. The 
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injury was 
not the result of an "accident" as that term 
back one goes in our body of law is not particu-
larly unexpected. In any event, I doubt that the 
new approach will produce unwavering consist-
ency over the years. 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 4, 
1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented by Sherlynn W. 
Fenstermaker, Attorney at Law. 
Defendants were represented by Henry K. Chai, II, 
Attorney at Law. 
Second Injury Fund was joined at the time of the 
proceedings and was not represented at the hearing. 
The issues to be addressed in this matter are as follows: 
1. Whether the applicant sustained injuries as a result 
of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986. 
2. Causal relationship of the injuries to the alleged 
accident. 
3. Temporary total disability compensation from March 25, 
1986 to November 24, 1986. 
4. Permanent partial impairment and apportionment of said 
impairment with defendant, Second Injury Fund. 
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5. Medical expenses including those for surgery on May 28, 
1986. 
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the medical issues were 
submitted to a special panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge. The 
Medical Panel Report was received and circulated to the parties. No 
objections were submitted to the Medical Panel Report. However, counsel for 
the defendant did submit legal memorandum regarding the issue of compensable 
accident. Counsel for the applicant responded on June 5, 1987. After 
reviewing the Medical Panel Report and the Memorandums submitted in this 
matter, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to make a Findings of Fact 
and enter an Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, is a 40-year-old 
male, who, at the time of his industrial injury, was married and had four 
dependent children under the age of eighteen. At the time of his injury, the 
applicant was earning $7.63 an hour, working forty hours per week. The 
applicant began his employment with the defendants in November of 1985. His 
duties consisted of running a grinder and some general maintenance work. It 
was the defendants' business to clean steel molds and plate the molds with 
enforcing steel. 
On March 25, 1986, around 2:00 p.m., the applicant was running his 
grinder. His supervisor asked him to move some steel plating, which was used 
to reinforce the molds. The steel plates were generally banded together and 
varied in width and length from 8 feet to 12 feet by 14 inches. Most of the 
plates were anywhere from 1/4 inch thick to 3/8 inch thick. The individual 
plates would weigh between 50 to 80 pounds, depending on the size. To move 
the plates, they had to be unhanded and moved individually. The applicant had 
moved two or three plates in this manner. On the next plate, he bent over, 
placing one hand on top of the plate and one hand underneath and began to 
raise it. When he had it approximately a foot and a half from the top of the 
stack, or at approximately his waist level, the applicant felt a sharp snap in 
his low back just above the waistline* He had an immediate radiation of sharp 
pains into his right leg. There was some question about the size of the plate 
the applicant was moving. He initially estimated it to be 12 feet by 14 
inches and to weigh approximately 80 pounds. However, the initial doctor*s 
report shortly after the incident, indicates that the plate weighed 
approximately 50 pounds. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge adopts that 
weight as the most probable weight. The applicant's pain was so sharp that he 
had to set the plate down, and he reported the incident to his supervisor. 
His supervisor had the applicant stay in the office for the remainder of the 
two hours of the shift doing light work. By the time he left for home, his 
pain had increased greatly and he developed a burning sensation in his right 
leg. 
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Because his condition had not improved the next morning, the 
applicant made an appointment with the chiropractor, Dr. Hansen. He received 
the proper industrial papers from his employer and submitted them to Dr. 
Hansen. X-rays were then taken. He commenced a course of manipulations and 
heat treatment and was directed to stay off work. The applicant was treated 
by the chiropractor for seven weeks. Because his condition had not improved 
at the end of the seven week period, Dr. Hansen referred him to Dr. Alan 
Hunstock, a neurosurgeon. 
The applicant first saw Dr. Hunstock in May of 1986. Dr. Hunstock 
directed him to Utah Valley Hospital for x-rays and a CT scan. After those 
tests had been completed, surgery was recommended. The surgery was performed 
on May 28, 1986, at Utah Valley Hospital. After his release, the applicant 
continued his follow-up care with Dr. Hunstock. The surgery was very 
successful in eliminating the applicant's right leg pain. He has had one or 
two small recurrences since the surgery, but they have been minor and have 
gone away quickly. He still has some backaches on a fairly regular basis, 
particularly in the morning. The only medication that he takes for pain is 
aspirin. The applicant was released to return to work on November 24, 1986. 
He was released with some restrictions regarding lifting and sitting. 
The applicant received a total of $1,750.10, in temporary total 
disability compensation which was paid from May 14, 1986 through June 5, 
1986. He was paid at the rate of $214.89 per week. 
The applicant has had several prior injuries. In 1978, while working 
for Tichner Ford, the applicant had an injury to his left knee. He was 
treated for that injury by Dr. Mendenhall. Although the incident was 
industrial, his benefits were denied because the applicant failed to report 
the incident to his employer. The applicant also sustained injuries to the 
little finger on his left hand in 1981, when it was cut on a steel plate. The 
tip was initially cut off and was sewn back on. The applicant has good use of 
the finger and was paid compensation for that injury. 
Although the applicant denies having had prior back injuries or 
problems, the records of Dr. Mendenhall indicate that he did treat the 
applicant for some low back pain in March of 1980, and again in November of 
1980. The treatment was primarily conservative but did include the use of a 
TENS unit and also some hospitalization. The records indicate that the 
incident occurred when the applicant bent over the fender of an automobile. 
The applicant has also had an injury to his head in February of 1984, 
while working in Park City. A nail gun, weighing approximately five pounds, 
fell and knocked him unconscious. At that time, he received treatment from 
Dr. Meyer. An MMPI test was given to the applicant following that injury. 
Dr. Meyer apparently diagnosed him as having a conversion disorder. 
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The medical panel assigned in this matter found that the applicant 
had an overall impairment of 12% of the whole person. Of that amount, 2% was 
assigned to his injury to his knee in February of 1978. The remaining 10% was 
attributed to the applicant's low back problems with 3/10 being attributed to 
the injuries in March of 1980t and 7/10 being attributed to the industrial 
accident in March of 1986. It was the panel*s opinion that there was a 
medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's low back 
problems and the industrial accident of March 25, 1986, and that the industrial 
injury did medically aggravate a pre-existing impaired condition of the 
applicant. It was also the panel's opinion that the surgery which was 
performed on May 28, 1986, was necessary for the applicant to recover from the 
aggravation of the pre-existing condition. The panel found that the applicant 
was temporarily and totally disabled from March 25, 1986 until the date of 
November 24, 1986, when he was released by his treating physician. No 
objections having been received, the Administrative Law Judge will adopt the 
findings of the medical panel as her own. 
The defendants have submitted a Memorandum indicating that the 
applicant has not met the burden of legal causation as announced in the Allen 
vs. Industrial Commission decision. Counsel for the defendants has argued 
that the panel pointed out that the applicant's back problem could have been 
triggered by lifting much less than a fifty pound weight and that the fifty 
pound weight is similar to some of the everyday activities as discussed by the 
Court in the Allen decision. However, the Administrative Law Judge is not 
inclined to construe the Allen decision in the same light as the defendants. 
It should be pointed out the facts in this matter are not substantially 
different from those in the Giles case where the applicant had a substantial 
pre-existing condition, but his actual injury was triggered by unusual 
exertion. In that case, it was clear that the applicant's eye problem could 
have been triggered by something considerably less than the exertion made. 
However, the Court upheld the findings of a compensable accident in that 
case. The Administrative Law Judge feels that this is a similar situation. 
The lifting of an awkward steel plate which weighs approximately fifty pounds 
from a level which is approximately between the applicant's waist and knees 
seems to the Administrative Law Judge a somewhat unusual exertion, particularly 
when it is viewed in light of the fact that the applicant had lifted several 
other steel plates in a similar manner just immediately preceding the 
occurrence. 
An adoption of the medical panel findings would indicate that the 
applicant is entitled to temporary total disability compensation at the rate 
of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25. Of this amount, 
the defendants have already paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a remainder due 
and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15. Additionally, the defendants would 
be liable for a 7% permanent partial impairment of the whole person or 21.84 
weeks at the rate of $215.00 per week for a total of $4,695.60. The 
defendant, Second Injury Fund, would be liable for a 3% permanent partial 
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impairment or 9.36 weeks at the rate of $215*00 per week for a total of 
$2,012,40, An attorney9s fee will be awarded in this matter based on the 
temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial impairment 
compensation minus the amounts of temporary total disability compensation 
already paid to the applicant. This would result in an attorney*s fee of 
$2,588.03. The defendant insurance carrier in this matter shall be entitled 
to reimbursement from the defendant, Second Injury Fund, for 30% of all 
temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses paid in this 
matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, sustained injuries 
as a result of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986, and is 
entitled to benefits in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, SISCO Hilte and/or 
Zurich American Insurance, pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith, compensation 
at the rate of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25. Of 
this amount, the defendants have paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a 
remainder due and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15, to be paid in a lump 
sum minus the attorney's fees to be awarded hereinafter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, SISCO Hilte and/or Zurich 
American Insurance, pay the applicant compensation at the rate of $215.00 per 
week for 21.84 weeks or a total of $4,695.60, as compensation for a 7% 
permanent partial impairment resulting from injuries sustained in his 
industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is accrued and to be paid 
in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of the industrial injury, said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay Sherlynn W. 
Fenstermaker, attorney for the applicant, the sum of $2,588.03, as attorney's 
fees, said amount to be deducted from the accrued aforesaid award of the 
applicant. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare fc&e necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of tSut Second Injury Fund, to pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith, 
compensation at the rate of $2,012.40, as compensation for a 3% permanent 
partial impairaaant resulting from pre-existing conditions which were 
aggravated by f8*e industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is 
accrued and to te paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS HIRTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Zurich American Insurance, 
shall be entitled to reimbursement for 30% of all temporary total disability 
compensation » § medical expenses upon the submission of a verified petition 
to the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund indicating the amounts so 
expended. 
IT IS fSURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be file* in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in (ftetail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Qvtimr shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt LsOke City, Utah, this 
30^ day af JfeeHy, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
Janet L: Hoffitt 
Administrative Lail 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburq I 
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On July 30, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant in the above-captioned case temporary total compensation, permanent 
partial impairment benefits and medical expenses related to a March 25, 1986 
back injury. Prior to the issuance of the Order, counsel for the defendant 
filed a Memorandum on the issue of legal causation. In that Memorandum, 
counsel for the defendant argues that the March 25, 1986 back injury is not 
compensable, because the applicant cannot establish legal causation, one of 
the elements of compensability per the Supreme Court case Allen v. the 
Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). As the applicant had a 
previous back condition prior to the March 1986 lifting incident, counsel for 
the defendant maintains the applicant must be able to show that the injury 
occurred pursuant to unusual exertion in order to establish legal causation. 
Counsel for the defendant finds that the lifting of a 50 pound steel plate is 
not unusual exertion as it is similar to a list of activities the Court in 
Allen found require only normal or usual exertion. Counsel for the applicant 
responded to the defendant's pre-hearing Memorandum stating that the weight 
and manner of lifting involved in the March 25, 1986 incident clearly takes 
the activity out of the usual exertion category. 
On October 2, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the 
defendant filed a Motion for Review of the Administrative Law Judge's July 30, 
1987 Order. Renewing the arguments earlier made in his pre-hearing 
Memorandum, counsel for the defendant argues that the Administrative Law Judge 
should not have awarded benefits, as the applicant failed to establish the 
legal causation element necessary for a finding of compensability. In the 
Memorandum supporting the Motion for Review, counsel for the defendant notes 
that the Industrial Commission has adopted a 20 pound standard for determining 
what lifting injuries will be considered unusually exertive. Counsel for the 
defendant maintains that use of this standard by the Administrative Law Judge 
is error as the Allen case list of activities requiring only normal exertion 
includes lifting activities that could involve items like the 50 pound plate 
lifted by the applicant. Specifically, counsel for the defendant notes that 
garbage cans and tires often weigh more than 20 pounds. Counsel for the 
applicant responds to this argument in a October 19, 1987 Response to the 
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Motion for Review. She states that the manner in which the applicant lifted 
the 50 pound plate has to be considered in determining the level of exertion 
involved in the March 25, 1986 incident. She notes that the applicant wasn't 
lifting with two hands as would be done in the Allen list of lifting 
activities, but rather with one hand only. 
The sole issue to be determined by the Commission on review is 
Whether or not the applicant was injured pursuant to unusual exertion on March 
25, 1986, thereby establishing the legal causation element of compensability. 
The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge 
with respect to the manner and weight involved in the March 25, 1986 lifting 
incident. Based on the Administrative Law Judge*s findings, the Commission 
finds the lifting incident at issue involved unusual exertion. The Commission 
does not believe a typical non-employment activity of men and women in the 
latter part of the twentieth century includes lifting 50 pounds. It is 
conceivable that a tire or garbage can may weigh 50 pounds, but the Commission 
believes they typically weigh less than that. The Commission has adopted no 
absolute 20 pound standard to use in determining which lifting incidents will 
be considered unusually exertive. The 20 pound "standard" comes from a foot 
note in the Allen case where the Court quotes with approval Professor Larson 
who states the "usual wear and tear of life - which certainly includes lifting 
objects weighing 20 pounds." The Commission finds each case must be 
determined based on its own facts and the Commission has been consistent in 
finding weight alone should not be the only consideration. In the instant 
case, the necessity of lifting comparatively heavy and awkward steel plates 
was a risk to the applicant caused by his employment that goes beyond what 
typically is required in non-employment life in general. Therefore, per 
Allen« liability for the injury caused by that risk is properly placed on the 
employer. Therefore, the Commission must affirm the Administrative Law 
Judge's finding that the March 25, 1986 accident meets the legal causation 
test and as result is compensable. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's October 2, 1987 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's July 30, 1987 Order is 
hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the Court of Appeals only 
within the thirty (30) day time limit and as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake^City, Utah, this 
7®*;. day of Mtfpkfc^ 1987. 
ATTESJ^ 
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CERTIFIED MAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Lester Wayne Smith 
115 North 1200 West 
Orem, UT 84057 
Re: Lester Wayne Smith 
Inj: 3-25-86 
Emp: Sisco Hilte 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
We are enclosing a copy of the signed Report of the Medical Panel in 
connection with your claim. 
You are allowed fifteen days from the date of this letter within 
which to file objections if you are not satisfied with the findings of the 
Panel. Please specify in detail the basis of your objections to each Finding 
and Conclusion. Further, state in detail the medical evidence or facts you 
rely on as a basis of your objection. Copies of objections must be mailed to 
all parties concerned. 
Parties who desire to submit the matter on written objections without 
a hearing may so indicate in a letter accompanying the objections. A hearing 
will not be set on the objections unless there is a proffer of conflicting 
medical testimony. If a hearing is scheduled, the Medical Panel Chairman will 
be requested by the Commission to appear and testify and all parties will be 
notified of the time and place of the hearing. 
When no objections to a Medical Panel Report are received, the 
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Janet L. Moffitt 
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Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Re: Lester Wayne Smith 
Inj: 03-25-86 ' 
Emp: Sisco Hilte 
REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL 
A medical panel, consisting of Drs. Boyd Holbrook and Madison H. Thomas, 
with the latter as chairman, met to review the case of Lester Wayne Smith, 
with reference to an industrial injury reported to have occurred on March 
25th, 1986. The patient's history was reviewed with him by members of the 
panel. The summary of the testimony was reviewed with him, with general 
agreement as to the outline of it. However, he did not recall Dr. Hunstock 
giving him any restrictions in releasing him for work. On the third page, 
he indicated it was the right knee that was injured. 
The medical file was reviewed with him, with particular reference to his 
1980 treatment. X-rays were reviewed and the patient was examined by the 
members of the panel. 
The applicant indicates that on March 25th, 1986, he was generally feeling 
well and having no difficulty with his health. Shortly after lunch, he was 
moving the plates of steel, approximately fifty feet and restacking them. He 
describes these plates as being about eight feet long and eight to ten inches 
wide, and one-fourth to three-eighths inch thick, weighing about 60 to 80 
poiunds. Usually, one man takes each end of the plate, but he was alone, 
and because of the urgency to get the area cleared, he was moving them him-
self. He had moved four or five of these after lunch. 
He reports that he bent over to pick up one of these plates, which he recalls was 
about a foot-and-a-half above ground level, on a pile. He got his hands under-
neath the plate, and believes his knees were slightly bent. His back was al-
most to a horizontal level, as he lifted on the plate. As he did so, he felt 
as if he had been hit in the lower back, and experienced severe pain there, 
as well as pain and a burning sensation down the back of his right leg, to the 
calf and to his whole foot. He dropped the plate back in place and reported 
to his boss, and an accident report was completed. He believes he spent 
most of the rest of the afternoon until a four o'clock quitting time, in 
the office. 
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He reports he drove home. The pain in his right leg ras worse than in the 
back. He took aspirin and lay on the bed, but found this was woise, so he 
spent some time standing up during the evening. He retired about nine or 
ten p.m., and slept poorly. In the morning, he could scarcely walk because 
of the pain, principally in the right leg. He called his boss, and then 
went for a chiropractic treatment. He was told bf ihe cfiir«pracyt<jrjttifty he 
had a disc that was pinching his sciatic nerve, aadJ h#e> had fhi/cjnaf ticj treat-
ments every other day for about seven weeks. At firsts 't?his*feeerfed'to help 
for an hour to an hour-and-a-half, but then it seemed not to help at all, 
and he was sent to Dr. Hunstock. 
The studies done by Dr. Hunstock comfirmed the presence of a herniated disc, 
and he reports that on May 28th, 1986, he had surgery. He had had severe 
pain, persisting up to the time of surgery, and describes walking at a 
45° tilt because of the pain and spasms. Immediately after surgery, he 
felt the severe pain was relieved, and he went home after five days. Since 
then, he has had good days and bad days, about half and half, but generally, 
he feels he has had a great deal of relief from the surgery. 
The patient indicates he continues to have some light pain, which has been 
increased in the past few weeks by increased activities, such as bowling. 
When he does something like this, he will take a couple of Tylenol and lie 
down for an hour or so and get to feeling better. Sitting on a bleacher 
seat without a backrest, likewise aggravated the pain. Occasionally, he 
has feelings of numbness in the right leg and foot, at times accompanied by 
tingling as far down as the bottom of the foot, which is increased with 
activities. He feels the back is still stiff, and that the severity of his 
pain is about as much in the back, as well as the leg. Coughing or sneez-
ing heavily will cause a sharp pain. Riding or sitting for very long will 
bother him. He prefers to walk or stand alternately with sitting. He has 
been active around the house and helps clean up the house, and tinker with 
things. He has been doing some taxidermy work at home. He has not returned 
to work, though he understands he was released on November 24th, without 
limitations, although he was given instructions in the use and care of his 
back. He has been seeking work, but there's not much available in his area. 
Hefs had no involvement with rehabilitation activities, though someone in 
Job Service talked to him briefly, but nothing has been done since. 
The patient indicates that in 1980, he pulled a muscle in his back, with a 
large knot, and he points to the right paraspinal lumbar region. He does not 
recall losing time from work at that time, and his regular medical insurance 
took care of the medical expenses at the time, although it was reported as 
an industrial event. 
I subsequently reviewed with him the details in the medical record, indi-
cating that he had reported that on March 4th, 1980, he had been bending over 
a fender and lifting something in his work as a mechanic, when he "felt 
something snap in the back11. He had spasms and pain at the time, and re-
calls taking time off work for physical therapy. He does not recall being 
in a hospital in April, but when we reviewed the records, he acknowledged 
he must have been in the hospital, but mixed it with some other injury. He 
feels he gradually improved, and felt fully recovered from that event, after 
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several months. 
He reports his general health has been good. He recalled no major medical 
illnesses. He recalls injuring a cartilage in his knee about ten years ago, 
and subsequently having surgery on the right knee. He slipped off a bumper 
and fell. This did not seem to bother him for about a- veek. until the knee 
locked, and he vent down. He had good response from the surgery, and feels 
he has no trouble with it, currently. 
In 1979, he lacerated his left fifth finger, near the knuckle, and recalls 
being hospitalized for three days for repair of it, with good response. He 
feels it occasionally will catch and will sometimes hurt, but it does not 
limit him in his work. He recalled the injury with the nail-gun when he 
was unconscious for a short time. He thinks he was knocked down, and it was 
about three hours before he knew what was going on. He believes his first 
recollection was after reaching Parkview Medical Center. He does not think 
he had any lost time from that, but had severe headaches, ultimately seeing 
someone for a psychiatric evaluation, and understanding they thought he had 
a "split personality". His headaches have improved, so that he only has them 
quite infrequently now. He has had no fainting spells or other indications 
of residual from the head injury. 
He previously used alcohol, but has had none in the past 15 years. It was 
never a problem for him. He has smoked about a pack of cigarettes a day for 
the past 25 years. He reports leaving school in the tenth grade. He has had 
some mechanical courses, but no further education. 
A review of the records shows the following highlights: There is a notation 
of an industrial accident reported on February 25th, 1978, which caused pain 
in the right knee and led to removal of the meniscus and shaving of the 
patella in the right knee, because of finding of a torn meniscus and chondro-
malacia of the patella. 
On September 12th, 1979, he lacerated his left hand and extensor tendon of 
the fifth finger was found and repaired. 
The records show the incident of sudden pain in his lower back when he was 
lifting something while bent over a fender, occurring on March 4th, 1980. 
He was noted to have severe pain and muscle spasms in the lumbar region. 
Straight leg raising was limited to 40° on the right. He had physical 
therapy on 30 occasions between March 19th and may 6th, as an outpatient, 
and was also treated as an inpatient from April 10th to 12th, 1980. He was 
given a TENS unit, and this was returned in four months, with a note "No 
symptoms", apparently indicating he had improved. On May 1st, 1980, an EMG 
showed a mild compromise of S-l roots, more on the right than the left, and 
mild irritation of the L-5 roots, more on the right than the left. On May 
11th, 1984, it was indicated he was knocked out for a few minutes, and suf-
fered a laceration, and was told to stay in bed for about five days. An EEG 
was within normal limits, as was a CT scan, skull X-ray, etc. 
On July 1, 1984, he had symptoms of vertigo, but these have apparently not 
recurred. In October, 1984, an X-ray of his ankle was taken, but he does 
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not recall what that was for. 
On March 25th, following the March 4th injury, he wa$ Rioted as «>eipfe '.tender 
over L5-S1, and having straight leg raising limited td 25c on the right, with 
90° allowed on the left. On May 12th, 1986, X-ray and CT scan showed abnor-
malities at 4-5 and 5-1. On May 28th, 1986, an L5r-Sl di«jec*«my#vasj#d<j$e. 
Dr. Hunstockfs notes confirm his steady trend of inereasjLiqg ;actiyi£d;e£ £t 
his encouragement subsequently. He has apparently ijot;b££Ti^ditatfon-flepen-
dent, and currently uses aspirin only intermittently. 
Examination revealed a patient of about the stated age of 40, who was tall 
and nonobese. He appeared generally well. Blood pressure 130/80. He was 
alert and responsive and showed no impairment of memory, thinking, or ability 
to communicate. He appeared to give responses as best his memory would 
serve him. 
Cranial nerve survey showed no abnormality. 
Sensory examination showed him to have a subjective decrease in perception of 
sharp object and the tuning fork, on the right foot and ankle, as compared 
with the left. Sensation above the foot was satisfactory. 
Motor examination showed him able to stand and walk, without difficulty. He 
could stand on single leg or walk tandem with eyes open or closed. He could 
hop on either leg and could walk on heels or toes. There was no asymmetry 
of strength, and calf and thigh measurements were equal. No abnormal in-
voluntary movements or abnormality of tone were noted. 
Reflexes were symmetrical and within normal limits, 2+ throughout, except for 
the right ankle jerk, which was a weak 1-1- response, and somewhat variable. 
The head and neck were not remarkable. No limitation of neck function, and 
the upper extremity range of motion and movements were all normal. The back 
showed a two-inch scar in the lumbosacral area, with tenderness over the 
scar. There was no tenderness in the lumbar paraspinal area. Buttocks tone 
was good. There was no sciatic tenderness. He could bend forward to reach 
within 10 inches of the floor, and there was very slight restriction of ex-
tension, lateral bending and rotation. There was no associated muscle 
spasm. 
The right knee showed a three-inch scar in the medial oblique position. This 
was well-healed. The patella appeared smooth. There was no joint crepitation 
or fluid, and the joint appeared stable. On forced flexion of the right knee, 
he reported pain spreading to the top of the right buttocks, but this did not 
occur on the left. With right hip flexion, there was slight limitation, and 
at the limits, he reported his toes tingled on forced flexion. This was normal 
on the left. Straight leg raising was free to 85° on the left, with a nega-
tive response ^c^fe^%%ching* There was a limitation at 70° on the right, 
with moderate/on stretching. The feet had normal temperature, color, and 
pulse. 
There was a curved one-and-a-quarter inch scar in the vicinity of the left 
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fifth knuckle. There was neglible limitation of fulx flexion r.nd medial 
stretching compared with the opposite hand, but the <*egre2 or range was 
within the published normals. A mild degree of hammer-toe pattern, affec-
ting the fifth toes bilaterally was found. 
COMMENT: 
It is apparent from combining the history and the medical records, that this 
person has had two significant events affecting his lower back. The first 
required extended periods of treatment, including use of a TENS unit. There 
was evidence of root compression on EMG, although he did not have the bene-
fit of X-ray or CT study, at the time. He perhaps confused his three days 
in the hospital for the back with the time he spent for repair of his 
left hand injury, and he no longer disagrees with the facts as recorded in 
the medical records. The second event occurred on March 25th, 1986, and 
led quite reasonably to surgical management, with relatively good results, 
since then. 
Assuming, but not deciding that the applicant was involved as outlined, 
the panel concludes in terms of reasonable medical probability as follows. 
1. There is a medically demonstrable causal connection between the 
applicant's low back problems and the industrial accident of March 
25h, 1986. 
2. All of the residual problems complained of by the applicant, were 
not caused by a pre-existing condition. 
3. The industrial injury medically aggravated a pre-existing im-
paired condition of the applicant, as suggested in the attached tabu-
lation. 
4. Assuming that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition occurred, 
the applicant may or may not have recovered, had he not had surgery on 
May 28th, 1896, but the panel feels that in view of the described 
pattern at the time, this would probably not have occurred within a 
reasonable period of time, and hence the surgery was entirely appro-
priate. 
COMMENT: 
It is well known that some individuals with discogenic pain will over a 
long period of time, stabilize and become relatively symptom-free, but the 
degree of pain, the findings on clinical and radiologic studies, etc., 
suggest that in some cases, this is not likely to happen within a reasonable 
interval. What a reasonable interval is depends on the severity of the pain, 
the nature of patient's response to it, the nature of the clinical and labo-
ratory findings, etc. 
5. The period or periods of time during which the applicant has been 
temporarily, totally disabled, as a result of the industrial injury, 
after March 25th, 1986, is from then until November 24th, 1986, the 
date on which his operating surgeon released him for work. 
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COMMENT: 
This is approximately a six-month interval, which is generally accepted as 
a conservative time, following this type of surgery, and apparently parallels 
the patient's feeling that he has reached a relatively stable level, although 
he has had fluctuations from day to day. 
6. The percentage of permanent physical imp&irment ihraip all Causes and 
conditions is shown in the attached table. 
7. The percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to 
the industrial injuries of March 4th, 1980 and March 25th, 1986, is 
as shown in the attached table. 
8. A percentage of permanent physical impairment attributabe to 
previous existing conditions is shown in the attached table. 
COMMENT: 
The above formulations are based on the history and medical records, indicating 
that following the 1980 lifting injury, he did have approximately a four 
month period of discogenic pain, although this was not proven by surgery. All 
of the clinical findings and patterns are consistent with this, including the 
fact the problem became quiescent after a period of months of treat-
ment, which included a short term of hospitalization. From then until March 
25th, 1986, he would be considered to have discogenic disease in a state of 
remission. In this circumstance, he is more vulnerable to additional diffi-
culty, than had he not had that previous incident and the panel has attempted 
to postulate a reasonable balance of contributory factors between these two 
incidents. 
Members of the panel will be happy to try and make further clarification on 
these matters if it would be helpful. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAT>ipiON H. THOMAS, M.D. 
BOYD HOLBROOK, M.D. 
MHT/TL429 
d: 3-2-87 
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zNo change in status of the knee is apparent since Dr. Mendenhall's 
evaluation, which was done according to guidelines in use at that 
time. The panel sees no need to change the percentage simply to 
comply with revised guidelines. 
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Although the panel was not asked to respond to some further specific 
questions, it is noted that in his letter of February 10th, 1987, Mr. 
Henry Chai II, raised additional questions, which we will respond to, 
aside from the formal panel report, in the event this will be of any 
value to you. 
With reference to his second paragraph on page two, it would appear that 
part of the discrepancy noted with respect to his right knee, might be 
accounted for by the fact that Dr. Mendenhall undoubtedly used AMA Guide-
lines in use at the time to give 5 percent of lower extremity or 2 percent 
of whole man. Newer guidelines indicate 10 percent of lower extremity or 
4 percent of whole man. (See chart at end or panel report.) 
With reference to his questions in the last paragraph, we have referred to 
the pre-existing condition prior to March 25th, 1986, as being disc disease 
in a state of remission. It is impossible to predict in a given case, 
whether that condition would continue to degenerate , or not, because some 
do and some do not. In general, someone in that condition is more suscep-
tible to future aggravation of the problem, but some cases will go on to 
a lifetime essentially symptom-free, and others will go on to increasing 
symptoms requiring further management. This is somewhat related to the 
nature of the demands made on the back after the first incident, but not 
entirely so, so that specific prediction is difficult. 
It is impossible for the panel to specify a "minimum weight" that would have 
triggered the pre-existing condition, because there is no provable point 
at which a weight will inevitably cause aggravation. It is well known that 
factors of the person1s relative posture or position of the back, with 
reference to what is being lifted, as well as the weight, must be taken into 
consideration. The way in which the lifting takes place, whether the object 
is held out away from the body or close to the body, has a bearing. The 
work circumstance, as to whether there is an alternative way of accomplishing 
the task, and at the same time minimizing the compression effect on the back. 
The degree to which there is a rotational component involved, also has a 
bearing of how much weight might have an effect in one person compared with 
another. Thus, it is quite reasonable to think that a weight much less than 
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50 pounds, could trigger recurring symptoms, depending upo'n the individual, 
upon the past status of the back, upon the posture of the back, upon .any. . 
turning and lifting mechanics involved, etc. Thus, it appears that »the concept 
of minimum weight is more a legal one than a medical one, since it appears 
to based more on legal determinations than on medical kjiopledgg. 
If the additional comments in this letter are redundant* please feel free 
to discard them, but since the questions have been raised, we thought we 
would respond while our focus on the case was fresh. 
Our differences from Dr. Hunstockfs conclusions in January 9, 1987 letter, 
are not substantive, but probably reflect simply a difference of interpre-
tation, based on the probability of our having somewhat more extensive 
records available than he had, at the time. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MADISON H. THOMAS, M.D. 
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Although the panel was not asked to respond to some further specific 
questions, it is noted that in his letter of February 10th, 1987, Mr. 
Henry Chai II, raised additional questions, which we will respond to, 
aside from the formal panel report, in the event this will be of any 
value to you. 
With reference to his second paragraph on page two, it would appear that 
part of the discrepancy noted with respect to his right knee, might be 
accounted for by the fact that Dr. Mendenhall undoubtedly used AMA Guide-
lines in use at the time to give 5 percent of lower extremity or 2 percent 
of whole man. Newer guidelines indicate 10 percent of lower extremity or 
4 percent of whole man. (See chart at end or panel report.) 
With reference to his questions in the last paragraph, we have referred to 
the pre-existing condition prior to March 25th, 1986, as being disc disease 
in a state of remission. It is impossible to predict in a given case, 
whether that condition would continue to degenerate , or not, because some 
do and some do not. In general, someone in that condition is more suscep-
tible to future aggravation of the problem, but some cases will go on to 
a lifetime essentially symptom-free, and others will go on to increasing 
symptoms requiring further management. This is somewhat related to the 
nature of the demands made on the back after the first incident, but not 
entirely so, so that specific prediction is difficult. 
It is impossible for the panel to specify a "minimum weight11 that would have 
triggered the pre-existing condition, because there is no provable point 
at which a weight will inevitably cause aggravation. It is well known that 
factors of the person's relative posture or position of the back, with 
reference to what is being lifted, as well as the weight, must be taken into 
consideration. The way in which the lifting takes place, whether the object 
is held out away from the body or close to the body, has a bearing. The 
work circumstance, as to whether there is an alternative way of accomplishing 
the task, and at the same time minimizing the compression effect on the back. 
The degree to which there is a rotational component involved, also has a 
bearing of how much weight might have an effect in one person compared with 
another. Thus, it is quite reasonable to think that a weight much less than 
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50 pounds, could trigger recurring symptoms, depending upon the individual, 
upon the past status of the back, upon the posture of the brcfc, upon any 
turning and lifting mechanics involved, etc. Thus, it appears :hat the concept 
of minimum weight is more a legal one than a medical one, since it appears 
to based more on legal determinations than on medical knowledp,*. 
If the additional comments in this letter are redundant, plcace fsel tr^e 
to discard them, but since the questions have been raised, we thought we 
would respond while our focus on the case was fresh. 
Our differences from Dr. Hunstock's conclusions in January 9, 1987 letter, 
are not substantive, but probably reflect simply a difference of interpre-
tation, based on the probability of our having somewhat more extensive 
records available than he had, at the time. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MADISON H. THOMAS, M.D. 
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